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This paper is concerned with the problems of achieving lasting peace. One dimension 
includes fairly sharing the post-war economic and political pie or the peace dividend. 
This requires post-war allocations that are envy free. Many peace agreements that end 
civil wars are notoriously unstable in that they are often not implemented, or break 
down after some time. Commitments to the peace treaty are simply not credible. One 
reason for that could be certain indivisibilities in perceived shares of power and income 
in the peace settlement, as well as the inability to correctly infer the value of path 
dependence when future reputation depends on present actions but the future is heavily 
discounted. The paper also discusses the role of another type of unfairness, namely a 
deep sense of humiliation, in determining acts of transnational terrorism, where force 
may not be the answer in attempting to deter deeply motivated persons.  
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1 Introduction 
It is now two decades since the founding of UNU-WIDER, an institute that commenced 
its activities under the leadership of the late Lal Jayawardena. Although its remit is 
primarily development economics research, other issues not narrowly related to 
economics have also been studied at WIDER. A good example, is the work of the 
historian Eric Hobsbawm, whose masterly analysis of contemporary world history was 
penned while at WIDER. The central thesis of Hobsbawm’s (1995) opus is the 
pervasively violent nature of the twentieth century with its two world wars; something 
which, on a global scale, is perhaps without historical parallel.1 Related to this notion of 
violence are the uncertainties and insecurities which bedevil us in the new millennium. 
The danger of nuclear holocaust, after which ‘the living would envy the dead’,2 seem 
long past. Yet many insecurities still loom large. The freedoms from want and fear are 
still far from being realized at the present time.3 Without the achievement of these two 
freedoms, human security cannot prevail, even if lip service is paid to human rights. 
Poverty is widespread, and vast swathes of the developing world are being marginalized 
in our globalized era.4 
 
To a great extent, inter-state wars have been largely replaced by intra-state conflict.5 
More importantly, these civil wars are closely related to poverty (the lack of the 
freedom from want).6 For example, poverty makes soldiering less unattractive. Conflict 
also helps to perpetuate poverty.7 This creates an interdependence between the freedoms 
from want and fear, as conflict (fear) and low-income (poverty) seem to go hand in 
hand.8 The number of countries in civil war may be declining,9 but their average 
duration during the 1990s was increasing.10 This makes the analysis of why peace 
                                                 
1 Earlier wars may have also been just as, or more, devastating such as wars between Rome and other 
Italian entities in the fourth century BC, the three-year war leading to the annihilation of Carthage in 
146 BC, the death and destruction wreaked by the armies of Changez Khan in the twelfth century, or even 
the English Wars of the Roses in the fifteenth century. But these wars were far more localized.  
2 Commonly attributed to the erstwhile Soviet leader, Nikita Kruschev.  
3 These are the last two of the four freedoms enunciated in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s State 
of the Union address to Congress on 6 January 1941. See www.Fdrlibrary.marist.edu/od4frees.html, 
accessed on 29 June 2005. 
4 See Murshed (2002b: 1-18). 
5 See Murshed (2002a) for a brief description as to their causes. 
6  See the model in Addison et al. (2002). 
7 See Collier et al. (2003) 
8 Not all poor or low-income countries descend into conflict, but most conflict ridden countries are poor 
or middle-income nations.  
9 See Hegre (2004). 
10 See Fearon (2004).   2
cannot be achieved or sustained an absolute imperative, if the twin freedoms and human 
security are to be achieved. 
 
Section 2 of this chapter is concerned with the problems of fairly sharing the post-war 
economic pie or the peace dividend. Walter (2001) and Wood (2003) point out that 
peace agreements to end civil wars are notoriously unstable in that they are often not 
implemented, or break down after some time. Commitments to the peace treaty are 
simply not credible. One reason for that could be certain indivisibilities in perceived 
shares of power and income in the peace settlement, as well as the inability to correctly 
infer the value of path dependence (when, for example future reputation depends on  
present actions, but the future is heavily discounted). These matters are considered in 
section 3. Section 4 briefly discusses the role of another type of unfairness, namely a 
deep sense of humiliation, in determining acts of transnational terrorism. Finally, 
section 5 concludes.  
2  Fairness and indivisibility  
Fearon (2004) points out that of all types of civil wars, those with secessionist 
tendencies and ‘sons of the soil’ dynamics, are both the most protracted and difficult to 
resolve. This could be because of an attachment to the inviolability of land and 
territorial sovereignty by both parties to the conflict. Certainly, other causes such as the 
ready availability of easily lootable narcotic or gemstone revenues that help finance 
conflict, or misperceptions about the chances of outright military victory, are important 
in prolonging conflict. But the indivisibility of war aims, symbols or land can also make 
certain civil wars intractable.  
 
Wood (2003) highlights indivisibility as a major impediment to peace deals. This arises 
when territory, symbols or revenue in a post-conflict situation cannot be divided up so 
as to achieve peace. The problem can be most acute when religious sites such as Har’m 
El Sharif or Temple Mount in Jerusalem are involved. Also, considerable difficulties 
arise when it is problematic to achieve compromise over a war aim such as land reform 
(Nepal and Colombia), or deep constitutional change (future of the monarchy in Nepal). 
There can also be seemingly irresolvable disputes over post-war power sharing, and the 
allocation of offices in a post-conflict government. This can lead to spoiler groups, 
usually but not exclusively amongst rebel groups, wrecking a peace agreement because 
it does not give them enough in terms of cabinet places or other lucrative positions in 
power. Secessionist wars where territorial sovereignty is contested can also be tricky to 
resolve. But in other cases, certain common territories can be dear to both sides, and the 
sharing rules proposed for them are not acceptable, as is the case with Har’m El Sharif 
or Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Compared to these, disagreements over sharing 
economic resources, such as oil revenues, may require less challenging solutions.11 For 
                                                 
11 A counter-example may be in the Sudan. Although the north and south had reached agreement earlier, 
the discovery of oil meant that the civil war rekindled and was finally resolved via oil revenue sharing.   3
example, it can be argued that separatist tendencies in Indonesia have eased following 
the decentralization of the fiscal system, which allows regions to keep more of locally 
generated natural-resource revenues. While the federal government is keen to preserve 
the territorial integrity of Indonesia, there are no indivisible symbols akin to Jerusalem.  
 
The theoretical literature on sharing and division offers us several insights. For example, 
Brams (2005) and Brams and Taylor (1996) point out several allocation rules for a 
single divisible good, many divisible goods and several indivisible goods. All of these 
have implications for durable peacemaking involving compromises over issues and 
post-war economic stakes. If a peace agreement, and the divisions and compromises it 
entails are perceived to be unfair then the deal itself will not be robust, as these 
arrangements will tend to break down. Sharing in this regard must be equitable in 
several senses, as well as being efficient. That is why envy-free allocative outcomes are 
so important. In an envy-free outcome each participant does not regard the allocation 
achieved by another player to be superior to what he/she has achieved. All the various 
allocative mechanisms considered by Brams (2005) and Brams and Taylor (1996) 
require design and implementation by an outside agency, a mediator and/or external 
power. This is all the more so in the case of allocations in a post-war situation. 
 
In the case of a single divisible good the analogy with cake cutting is applicable. This 
may, for example, concern the division of the post-war peace dividend, which includes 
natural resource revenues and the imputed value of post-conflict overseas development 
assistance. Cake cutting, in a two player situation, implies one person doing the cutting 
and the other player having the right to call a halt to the slicing procedure. The 
application of the envy-free criterion, however, may entail several slices or divisions 
that may be inefficient and in excess of the number of parties to the conflict. This will 
be all the more true if what is being divided up is not homogenous. One can visualize 
situations to do with the division of the expenditure categories of post-war aid, and the 
dividing up of land that may require a great deal of parcelling.12  
 
A second situation considered by Brams (2005) and Brams and Taylor (1996) entails 
several items to be divided, each of which is in principle divisible. Peace negotiations 
usually involve several issues, including regional autonomy, sharing of resource rents 
(such as oil revenues in the Sudan), constitutional changes, power sharing in the federal 
government and so on. Typically these issues will involve a long period of extended 
bargaining. The procedure behind the settlement, if reached, is described as the 
‘adjusted winner mechanism’. The adjusted winner mechanism not only satisfies the 
standard efficiency and equity criteria, but additionally has a further equitability 
                                                 
12 If all players are risk-averse they will follow a maximin strategy, that is they will maximize the 
minimum allocation that they can achieve with certainty compared to uncertain prospects that yield higher 
returns but entail a positive probability for an outcome which is less than their maximin outcome. This is 
also like saying that those who dislike risk will do their best to achieve a minimum target or utility 
threshold.   4
condition, because it ensures that each player gets more than its share of the bargaining 
chips initially allotted to them. For example, in a two-person case, each player will get 
more than 50 per cent of the total value attached to all the issues and goods at stake. 
 
Negotiations on the issues involve placing upper and lower bounds on the values of 
each issue, bearing in mind that assigning pecuniary values is more amenable in 
quantifiable matters such as resource rents rather than for non-monetary matters 
involving status such as who should be President. Each side will allocate weights on the 
different issues at hand, and given that each side has a similar number of bargaining 
chips, each party will win on some of the disputed issues. These will tend to be in areas 
most highly valued by the concerned protagonist. So if regional autonomy is more 
highly prized by a rebel group compared to resource rents, they will put a higher weight 
on it and secure that goal under the adjusted winner mechanism. In general, players will 
remain honest, and not risk losing on high valued issues by undervaluing their personal 
bid for them out of their total allocation of bargaining chips. But one side can end up 
with wins on many high valued issues, and the consequent allocation could be 
inequitable to the other side. So this mechanism requires an equitability adjustment. 
Basically, this means sharing on high valued issues where the two sides preferences are 
close, or the weights assigned to them out of their bargaining chip allocation are similar. 
So if the government and the rebels assign a close and high weight to resource rents, 
they must share these. In other words, if the government and the rebels both value 
resource rents highly, one side cannot equitably be allowed to be a sole winner. There 
has to be a revenue sharing mechanism on this issue. Other issues, where values diverge 
considerably, tend to be winner take all based on which side places the higher value. 
This adjusted winner mechanism gives both sides an allocation which is roughly equal 
and more than 50 per cent of the assigned weights from the bargaining chip pile. The 
problem with applying this equitability included adjusted winner mechanism is that 
many issues are not easily divisible, such as which side gets to first occupy a rotating 
post-war Presidency. A further difficulty can arise if the two sides do not have similar 
bargaining power, something that external actors need to engineer. 
 
Third, and most importantly, Brams (2005) and Brams and Taylor (1996) consider 
allocating several indivisible issues. Once again external intervention or mediation is 
required. The allocation of indivisible goods requires the application of the envy-free 
principle for any allocation to endure. And, a unique envy-free allocation may not be 
Pareto-efficient. Pareto efficiency means that one side cannot be made better off without 
making another side worse off.13 One can make an envy-free allocation Pareto efficient 
by improving the utility of one side without lowering the utility of the other. But such 
allocations may not remain envy-free as one side could have a lower allocation of 
relatively more highly prized items (yielding the same utility) that are being allocated, 
                                                 
13 This is, however, consistent with one person having everything and another person nothing in a two-
person world.   5
and consequently resent the other sides allocation. A similar argument can be made 
about a maximin allocation being envy-possible. Consider an application of the envy-
free principle to the elections held in Iraq in January 2005. A criticism of the method 
adopted in that Iraqi election, for example, could be that the electoral mechanism (one 
person-one vote instead of representative bodies of each community) was not envy-free 
for the minority Sunni community, and had therefore not enlisted their full co-
operation.14 Furthermore, the power sharing mechanism devised does not have the 
properties of the equitability adjustments of the adjusted winner mechanism, which 
would give each side a larger share of the outcome than is strictly proportional to the 
bargaining chips it receives. One could even argue that the Sunnis received a smaller 
allocation of the total bargaining chips for negotiation than is warranted by their 
historical position. Despite the fact that the historical Sunni domination in Iraq was 
disproportionate to their (minority) population share, the present US-backed 
dispensation makes them feel vulnerable and disproportionately disadvantaged because 
of the lack of perceived constitutional safeguards for special groups. To them, there is a 
palpable lack of consensus and consultation.15 The country is, consequently mired in a 
multi-faceted civil war. 
 
Generally speaking, allocations involving indivisible items that are more qualitative are 
more difficult to achieve. The answers, in the more intractable cases, must lie in 
sharing, equal user rights and other ‘federal’ type arrangements that eschew winner-
takes-all outcomes.16 
 
Wood (2003) considers non co-operative strategies of actors in a conflict, and whether 
their strategies to fight or compromise are self-enforcing without third party mediation. 
This is at variance with allocative rules considered by Brams (2005) and Brams and 
Taylor (1996) involving mediation and refereeing, making the outcome resemble co-
operative solutions. The decision to compromise is based on the pay-off in the peaceful 
state, as well as beliefs about the strategy which will be adopted by one’s opponent. 
There also has to be bargaining over the share of the post-war pie that each side gets. 
The Nash equilibrium can involve either fighting or compromise; multiple equilibria are 
possible. If each side’s expected post-war share is greater than what they can get from 
fighting, feasible compromise equilibria exist. But that depends upon beliefs about the 
other side’s strategy. The feasible compromise equilibrium and the sharing it involves 
may not coincide with beliefs about the opponent’s strategy. In general, there will be an 
optimal share of the post-war pie for each side which will maximize the robustness of a 
peaceful settlement (that is the agreement lasting or being self-enforcing) given beliefs 
                                                 
14 In practice, the allocation of power in Iraq amongst the various communities includes several divisible 
and indivisible issues. 
15 Shurah in Arabic. 
16 As is the case in the Westminster (and American) style first past the poll electoral systems that often 
result in less compromise, consensus and power sharing.     6
of the two sides about each other. Within each group there may be factions or spoiler 
groups with more pessimistic views about their opponent’s strategies. This will depress 
their value of any share of the post-war pie. Indivisibilities regarding the issues 
contested, and the post-war pie, also lower the expected worth of any share of the post-
war settlement, making self-enforcing compromises difficult. In more extreme cases, as 
with virtually all contemporary civil wars, this may require external intervention in the 
form of aid to increase the total size of the potential peace dividend, so there is simply 
more to be shared. In the case of sites and symbols steps have to be taken to encourage 
sharing and envy-free access through confederal structures. This may require 
diplomacy, and in some cases coercive intervention by external powers. 
3  Indivisible periods and commitment problems 
Another form of indivisibility arises when the future is heavily discounted, and when 
the future costs of current actions are similarly undervalued. We may describe this as 
the lack of recognition of path dependence. This may lead to problems of commitment 
to negotiated settlements even when Pareto optimal, that is when each side is better off 
in a state of peace. A commitment or credibility problem implies that the signal, or 
treaty, establishing peace is simply ‘cheap talk’, and by implication the arrangement is 
not self-enforcing. In most situations, war is irrational and inefficient (not Pareto 
optimal) as pointed out by Skaperdas (1992, 2002). Why is therefore the credibility of 
the commitment to peace treaties so fragile? There could also be misperceptions about 
the benefits of war, or an overestimation of the prospects of military victory. 
 
To deal with misperceptions first, the most obvious candidate that prevents peace in this 
category of explanations for civil war persistence is an overestimate of the probability 
of military victory, see Collier et al. (2004) in this connection. The same authors also 
emphasize that the state of war may also be highly profitable for one or more of the 
belligerent groups. This is likely in the case of the presence of contraband substances 
such as illegal drugs, and lootable minerals such as alluvial diamonds.  
 
The commitment problem to an agreed peace treaty is also a serious problem, and 
deserves further consideration. This difficulty arises when it is in the interest of one or 
either side to renege on the promise of peace, and the actions that peace involves. For 
example, in the model contained in Addison and Murshed (2002) one side to a peace 
treaty may wish to renege on its commitment to peace because it allows them then to 
loot valuable natural resource rents. The expropriation of these rents cannot take place 
without one side fooling the other, by feigning to make peace and later reneging on this 
undertaking. In that situation, when peace is not incentive compatible, commitments 
lack credibility and acquire the characteristics of cheap talk.  
 
Sometimes agents or groups cannot commit credibly because there are no institutions or 
mechanisms upon which to anchor promises. In that situation they are not believed,   7
even when they are honest. For governments, this is more likely in the context of weak 
state capacity, as it is difficult for a state to guarantee pledges when its own legitimacy 
and power base is fragile.  
 
An aspect of the commitment problem that has received scant attention is the very high 
discount rates, or the short time horizons of some of the parties involved (Addison and 
Murshed 2002). In situations of poverty and high uncertainty, agents may strongly 
prefer a dollar today to a dollar tomorrow. Although the absolute value of future peace 
may be much higher than that of continued warfare, the present value may be much 
lower when the discount rate is very high and there is an impatience to consume. The 
same argument can be applied to reputation, a factor that is central to the credibility of 
peacemaking. Breaking an agreement damages future reputation, but with a high 
enough discount rate it might pay to renege because the cost comes in the future. Each 
failure of the peace process raises the discount rates of the belligerents, thereby 
increasing the difficulty of making peace. Given the tarnished reputations of belligerents 
it is even harder to establish credible peace.  
 
Solutions lie in directly increasing the cost of reneging on peace agreements and 
devising commitment technologies through institutional innovation, particularly at the 
international level. The latter is particularly important because, as noted above, many 
contemporary civil wars do not have self-enforcing negotiated settlements. Without 
external intervention, and the sanctions that entails in terms of peacekeeping, as well as 
the palliative effect associated with aid, peace is just not sustainable. Improving the 
quality of peacekeeping forces is an urgent need, as is increased commitment to 
bringing war criminals to trial. Peacekeeping also needs to be more legitimate and 
acceptable, and the current ventures involving co-operation between local peacekeepers 
(as in the case of African Union interventions) and major aid donors (the European 
Union) is a step in the right direction. More adequately mandated and efficient United 
Nations involvement can enhance the acceptability of peacekeeping operations.  
 
With regard to commitment and commitment technologies there are four factors that 
deserve further consideration: the separation of economic life and politics, time 
horizons, institutional settings and the underproduction of external sanctions. 
3.1 Economics  and  politics 
When we assess why some ‘post-conflict’ countries returned frequently to war (Angola) 
while others have managed to sustain peace (Mozambique), economic motivations may 
lie at the root of the problem—Mozambique has few valuable minerals over which to 
fight while Angola has several—and this may help explain several peace commitment 
failures in Angola. There may be situations when conflict and business entrepreneurs 
are one and the same, as in many cases in Africa. That is when rulers themselves are 
directly engaged in appropriating lootable mineral resource rents. This makes the 
commitment to peace less likely to hold, compared to societies with a relatively stricter   8
dichotomy between those who rule (politicians) and those who conduct economic 
affairs. This is because in the former case the political and economic interests are one, 
and clearly pro-war. Economic interests in this instance centre around war-contracts and 
the harnessing of resource or illicit drug rents. In the latter case there is some room for 
competition between different interests; business activities such as the exporting of 
manufactured goods from Sri Lanka or Nepal may be disrupted by the war. Even when 
there are links between the two groups, the greater the institutional separation through 
parliament and the political process, the better are the chances for lasting commitments 
to peace. 
3.2 Time  horizons 
This turns out to be a crucial feature in individual decisions. When a future is seen to 
feasibly exist, this results in more peaceful attitudes, even in situations where deep-
seated historical grievances are present. Generally speaking investment, which only 
bears fruit in the future, requires a long time horizon. More secure and affluent societies 
tend to have a longer time horizon and recognize the path dependence of current actions. 
By contrast severely war torn, insecure and poorer societies have shorter time horizons, 
with a very strong preference for a dollar today compared to an uncertain prospect of 
more than a dollar in the future. Short-term income may be readily obtainable in a war 
situation, even if war destroys future earning prospects. In the language of economics, 
this is referred to as a high discount rate applied to future income, as opposed to the 
high value put on present consumption. All of this means discounting the future cost of 
conflict, as well as undervaluing the tarnished future reputation which arises from an 
excessive zeal for short-term profit. Furthermore, societies with faulty and degenerating 
institutions of governance and democracy tend to have a high discount rate, as the future 
is uncertain. New and fledgling democracies are often characterized by these high 
discount rates, as the future is uncertain due to the fact that the political system may 
collapse. The state apparatus in this situation run the risk of descending into 
kleptocracy. The important point here is that many groups in these situations are also 
characterized by similar short-term mentalities, making them often prefer current profits 
in a war situation when compared to investing for a far greater income that peace might 
bring in the future. Also, investment in trying to bring about future peace can have 
substantial present-day costs in terms of foregone profit.  
3.3  Institutions of commitment 
Even when all parties agree to and recognize the benefits of peace they need to credibly 
commit to peace, and the conditions stipulated therein. Generally, this requires 
institutions that help parties to credibly anchor their commitment to the peace treaty. 
The fear of reversal in the context of poor commitment technologies, leads to a peace 
treaty being imperfectly credible. And if it is not credible, the peace agreement will not 
last. Leaders of various groups and factions will then tend to behave like roving bandits 
with little concern for the country, like stationary bandits who have an encompassing   9
interest in nurturing the tax base from which they obtain rent (Olson 1996). A poor 
environment for commitment often arises when the government or the rebel leadership’s 
power base is weak and/or lacks legitimacy. Solutions here lie in devising better 
mechanisms to engender credible commitment via institutional improvement. This 
includes better constitutional safeguards, greater respect for the rule of law and superior 
regulatory capacities. This may be even a part of a society’s democratic transition.17 
Existing domestic institutions often degenerate beyond redemption in many conflict 
ridden societies, making externally enforced commitment technologies imperative in the 
interim before domestic institutions can once again evolve.  
3.4  Underproduction of external sanctions 
Externally devised commitment technologies could be the key to ending conflicts where 
the peace treaty is otherwise not self-enforceable, as is usually the case in contemporary 
civil wars. Sanctions, aid trade restrictions and resource redistribution, if effective, 
might help to eliminate conflict. But external sanctions, themselves, must not be 
perceived by potential combatants as cheap talk. In other words, the external sanctions 
must also have credibility. If the cost of effective sanctions is too high, or it yields little 
security benefit to the sponsor as is likely to be the case for conflicts in distant lands, 
there is under-production of the sanction, making it more likely that it really is cheap 
talk. Perhaps, that is why we do not see the end of many civil wars in Africa, where 
large territories as in the Congo are policed by relatively small and weakly empowered 
peacekeeping forces. Civil wars in Europe, such as in the Balkans, by contrast are 
quickly concluded, with a huge relative (to population and geographical size) 
commitment in peace keeping forces and aid. The will and resources to end more distant 
wars by external powers may be more strictly limited. In the ultimate analysis, credible 
commitments to peace must be found in effective domestic constitutional restraints and 
delegation. These domestic commitment technologies require deep interventions in 
institution building, something that is notoriously difficult to achieve because of the 
persistence of vested interests in conflict.  
4  Humiliation and terrorism 
This section discusses transnational terrorism, which along side the other forms of 
violence and insecurity considered in this chapter are also a product of injustice and 
unfairness. What is more relevant here is individual, rather than group behaviour. A 
transnational terrorist act is one that impacts on the citizenry or interests of a country 
not directly part of the conflict in question. It can occur anywhere, both in the country 
where the conflict is occurring or elsewhere. Thus, for example, if the USA or the West 
is a target, then its citizens may be attacked in countries where the attackers are fighting 
the state, such as in Egypt. Attacks, kidnappings and bombings can also occur in third 
                                                 
17 See Haggard and Kaufman (1995).   10
countries, such as Malaysia, Bali (Indonesia) and Saudi Arabia; attacks on US interests 
can take place in the USA (such as against the Twin Towers), or elsewhere as with the 
US embassy bombings in East Africa. More recently, there have been direct attacks in 
the UK and Spain. Transnational terrorism may reflect the internationalization of 
domestic disputes (Doran 2002). So, for example, the attacks on September 11, 2001 
may reflect an act of war against an external sponsor (USA) of the real enemy (the venal 
and apostate government of Saudi Arabia). A similar argument can be made about acts 
of violence against Western tourists in Egypt, where the real enemy is the pro-Western 
government of Egypt. 
 
From the viewpoint of the individual perpetrator of transnational terrorism, such as a 
suicide bomber, intrinsic motivation, which is often the outcome of the collective sense 
of humiliation (Lindner 2001), plays a greater role; therefore deterrence against terrorist 
groups may backfire if it hardens their resolve to resist, as is modelled by Addison and 
Murshed (2005). Deterrence can, however, influence the choice of targets by terrorists. 
Depending on relative difficulty, the target may shift from sponsor interests in other 
lands to sponsor countries, or even to where the real enemy is located. We do see 
shifting targets from the Twin Towers to Bali, to Saudi Arabia, to Madrid and London. 
Individual terrorist groups are often relatively small, and can be very creative in terms 
of organising finance for their localized cells, and evading sanctions, in order to carry 
out acts that are relatively much less costly and simpler than in the case of civil war. 
 
Individual perpetrators of terrorist acts are usually not uneducated and poor (Krueger 
and Maleckova 2002), unlike in the case of civil wars where the soldiery is often drawn 
from the ranks of the impoverished whose alternative gainful employment prospects are 
scant. In fact, education can act as an indicator of reliability in acts such as suicide 
bombing. Terrorism requires individuals to express solidarity with an intrinsic cause or 
value, where the notion of pecuniary gain associated with greed in the case of civil wars 
is totally irrelevant. Individual utility functions associated with terrorism are altruistic. 
There is not only identification with a cause, something that can also be present in 
passively interested individuals, but an imperative to participate in furthering the cause. 
This urge to act may result in violent action including self-destruction. From the 
viewpoint of individual choice, suicide bombing may be a rational act as explained by 
Wintrobe (2002). This is because the individual has made an all or nothing choice between 
solidarity with a cause and individual autonomy. An all or nothing choice involves a 
‘corner solution’ to a utility maximization problem. In this situation, changing relative 
prices (increasing deterrence) has little impact on individual choice, which is another 
way of saying that deterring terrorism will not succeed in preventing people from 
committing to their cause, even if the success rate of individual acts of terrorism 
diminishes. Alternatively, deterrence has to be very large to prevent individuals from 
carrying out violent deeds in this context of deep humiliation. In many cases this 
implies the physical annihilation or mass deportation of ‘terrorists’. Such acts of 
deterrence are, however, not feasible in democracies with the exception of a state like   11
Israel. Many societies and groups are willing to go to great lengths and to sacrifice 
themselves out of a sense of deep humiliation.18 Economists, in particular, are guilty of 
ignoring these types of preferences, which are less amenable to ‘relative price’ changes. 
Addressing the issues that cause humiliation, including those that disaffect second or 
third generation migrants in Europe are important to finding permanent solutions to 
terrorism. 
5 Conclusions 
Human security in the form of the freedoms from want and fear are inter-related. One of 
the great insecurities of the present age is the fact that there are civil wars in many low-
income nations where poverty is also endemic. Indeed as Collier et al. (2003) and other 
authors have emphasized, the most significant and robust factor in determining the risk 
of civil war is a low-per capita income, implying that poverty and underdevelopment 
can result in outright violent conflict between different groups in society. In short 
poverty breeds conflict, and conflict helps to perpetuate poverty. Tackling one issue 
without paying attention to the other is futile.  
 
One cannot overemphasize the differing natures of the motivations behind civil war and 
transnational terrorism. The former is intimately linked to poverty; the latter not 
necessarily so, being much more connected to acts of solidarity with collective 
humiliation and other causes. That is why we see many of these acts of terrorism being 
perpetrated by relative educated and affluent individuals, including citizens (drawn from 
different ethnicities) of developed countries. Where mass deportation and physical 
extermination is not an option, as is the case in most democracies, addressing issues 
connected with humiliation is of utmost importance. Here, dialogue with disaffected 
groups may act as a palliative, just as indiscriminate criticisms of large groups (for 
example Muslims, who are about a fifth of humanity) have an inflammatory effect. 
 
The message to policymakers is clear. Most conflict ridden countries have weakened 
state capacity, so that the state can no longer be regarded as an impartial actor in all of 
its traditional conflict prevention functions. So some external intervention is required to 
restore peace and security, including rebuilding state capacity. Tackling inter-group or 
horizontal inequalities can also be central to preventing and ending conflict. This means 
poverty reduction, growth, greater political participation and improved governance. As 
far as peace settlements are concerned, they are generally not self-enforcing without 
external help and commitment; peacekeeping is something that is inadequately supplied 
in many parts of the world. Ultimately, however, peace in any corner of the world is a 
public good, because of the potential costs of humanitarian intervention and managing 
refugee flows if there is war. Making peace settlements durable implies that sometimes 
the indivisible has to be made divisible through intervention in the form of diplomacy 
                                                 
18 See Lindner (2001) on this.   12
and coercion which encourage sharing, as well as greater economic aid to make the 
peace dividend more palpable. It also means devising institutions that help anchor 
commitment. Furthermore, post-war allocations need to be envy-free in order for them 
to endure. In the final analysis, lasting security cannot be achieved by coercion alone; 
without economic development and broad-based poverty reduction the disincentive to 
resort violence is always small. 
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